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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
CONSTITUTIONAL UNIFoMITY AND EQUALITY IN STATE TAXATION. By Wade
J. Newhouse, Jr. University of Michigan, 1959. Pp. xxii, 853.
Professor Newhouse has produced the first comprehensive and systematic

study of the equality and uniformity in taxation provisions of the constitutions
of the various states. In a prodigious study done at the Legislative Research
Center of the University of Michigan Law School, Professor Newhouse has
analyzed with painstaking care the constitutional provisions of each state and
the decisions interpreting the provisions. The work also contains a chapter on
the equal protection of the laws clause of the federal constitution as affecting
uniformity and equality in state taxation.
The author classifies state uniformity clauses into nine categories: (1)
property shall be taxed according to its value, (2) property shall be taxed in
proportion to its value, (3) the legislature may impose proportional and
reasonable assessments, rates and taxes upon all persons and estates within the
state, (4) there shall be a uniform rule of taxation, (5) taxation shall be equal
and uniform, (6) the legislature shall provide by law for a uniform and equal
rate of assessment and taxation, (7) taxes shall be uniform upon the same
class of subjects, (8) taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of property,
and (9) there shall be a fair distribution of the expense of government.
The author analyzes the decisions of the various states in the light of these
constitutional provisions in relation to the key questions presented. First, he
considers the applicability of the clause, i.e., whether the constitutional provision applies to all taxes, or only to property taxes. The author finds in general
what might have been expected, that where the clauses are of Types 1 or 2
(which use the word "property") the courts have uniformly found the provisions applicable only to property taxes.1 Curiously, however, in those states
with Type 8 clauses ("taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of property"),
there is a conflict; the Kentucky and North Carolina cases treat the clause as
applying to all taxes, whereas the courts in five other states have limited its
applicability to property taxes.2 And in all ten states having clauses that call
for taxation to be "equal and uniform" (Type 5) or for a "uniform and equal
rate of assessment and taxation" (Type 6)-although property taxes are not
explicitly mentioned, the clauses have been restricted to property taxes. 3 The
greatest diversity arises in those states having clauses requiring taxation to be
"uniform among the same class of subjects" (Type 7). Seven of the thirteen
states have ruled that the clause applies to all taxes, in five the uniformity is
limited to property taxes, and in two states the results are uncertain. 4
Similar comparative analyses along these lines are made by the author as
to the judicial construction of the clauses with respect to (a) the universality
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of the clause, whether all property except that designated as exempt by the
constitution must be taxed, (b) the restrictions on effective rates, whether all
property taxed by a single taxing authority must be assessed at the same ratio
of valuation and at the same rate so as to produce uniformity in effective rate,
and (c) the method of taxation, whether property taxation is limited to the
ad valorem method or whether other modes of tax on property may be employed. In a summary of summaries illustrated by a "Chart of Literal and
Effective Property Tax Uniformity Limitations," the author states:
Summarizing, we find that twenty-three states have the strictest
types of effective uniformity limitations. This includes Michigan,
which might be subject to question. However, of these twenty-three
states there are nine which have modified the effective limitation to
permit to some degree classification of property for taxation. These
modifications have been made without altering the basic uniformity
clause. On the other hand, there are twenty-five states which permit
classification for rates. However, of these twenty-five there are ten
states which do not permit classification for exemptions. Thus, in terms
of the existing effective limitation of uniformity in taxation, a substantial majority of the states (twenty-five plus nine) have an effective
limitation of uniformity in taxation which does not prohibit some form
of a classified property tax.5
After having read through the approximately 600 pages devoted to a
statement of the provisions and a state-by-state study of the construction of
the provisions by the courts-with extensive case-by-case discussion (including
critical comments) of the leading cases in the state-and about 100 pages of
comparative analyses and summary of the results reached, I was left with the
impression that the author's prodigious labors had produced highly valuable
materials and critical comments, case-by-case and state-by-state, but that the
grand architecture of the meaning and integration of the materials was somehow missing. I suspect this is due to the author's method of state-by-state
analysis, which though a useful form of presentation from the point of view
of the work's utility as a reference source, does not lend itself to a critical
evaluation of the cases and holdings on an overall basis.
Indeed, this is illustrated in the one area in which the author departs from
his state-by-state analysis and treats the problem in the light of all the cases
and all the constitutional provisions-the effects of the constitutional restrictions on state income taxation.0 If the uniformity and equality provisions apply
to the income tax, then a graduated income tax, or one allowing personal exemptions is likely to be held unconstitutional. The author traces this important
struggle in state fiscal history, the results of which helped shape the nature and
distribution of the tax burden in many states. An early landmark decision was
the Advisory Opinion of the Massachusetts Supreme Court handed down in
S. Pp. 677-678.
6. P. 690 et seq.
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7
1915, which held, in reliance on the Pollock case that a tax on income from
property would constitute a property tax, that it would be subject to the uni8
formity and equality, clause, and if graduated would be unconstitutional.
Three years later the Supreme Court of Missouri rejected this holding and
concluded that an income tax is not a property tax and was not within the
scope of the State's uniformity and equality clause0 These two decisions spearheaded the struggle in the courts over the state income tax, a struggle which
swept the country as the* movement spread for the enactment of the levy.
Holdings that a graduated income tax violated the state constitutional restrictions have had their repercussions to this day and have thwarted the efforts of
legislators in Illinois, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Washington and other
States, to adopt this modern, progressive levy.' 0 In some States the problem
was dealt with by constitutional amendments explicitly authorizing the enactment of graduated net income taxes. 1 Certainly the clear trend in recent years,
as Professor Newhouse points out, has been to exclude the income tax from
the restrictive clauses.' 2 As a result of these developments some 30 States
now impose income taxes.' 3 The author's study and critical evaluation of this
feature of the uniformity and equality provisions is one of the best chapters
in the book, in part I believe, because he has dealt with it as a problem wherever it arose.
There is one other basic weakness in the work. It deals with the constitutional provisions largely in the abstract, by reference to judicial doctrine and
varying constructions of minutiae of difference in constitutional language, without sufficiently relating the materials to their impact on taxpayers and on the
taxing process. The uniformity and equality provisions were directed primarily
at assuring equal treatment of taxpayers similarly situated in the property tax
field. In many states, as the author shows, the provisions have a broader
scope. But certainly the accomplishment of uniform equality in the property
tax field was their prime objective. Yet, the most striking feature of property

7. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Company, 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
8. In re Opinion of the Justices, 220 Mass. 613, 108 N.E. 570 (1915). As a result
of this decision Massachusetts does not have a graduated income tax. A constitutional
amendment was adopted in 1915 to limit the impact of the court's decision, but the
court held that the new provision merely permits specific and varying rates on differing
types of income but does not permit a general graduated income tax. In re Opinion of
the Justices, 266 Mass. 583, 165 N.E. 900 (1929).
9. Ludlow-Saylor Wire Co. v. Wollbrin, 275 Mo. 339, 205 S.W.2d 196 (1918).
10. Bachrach v. Nelson, 349 I1. 579, 182 N.E. 909 (1932); Kelley v. Kalodner, 320
Pa. 180, 181 Adt. 598 (1935); Eliasberg Bros. Mercantile Co. v. Grimes, 204 Ala. 492, 86
So. 56 (1920); Culliton v. Chase, 174 Wash. 363, 25 P.2d 81 (1933); Opinion of the
Justices, 99 N.H. 525, 113 A.2d 547 (1955).
11. See, e.g., Alabama, Kentucky and Wisconsin.
12. Featherstone v. Norman, 170 Ga. 370, 153 S.E. 58 (1930); Miles v. Department
of Treasury, 209 Ind. 172, 193 N.E. 855 (1935), appeal dismissed, 298 U.S. "640 (1936);
Sims v. Ahrans, 167 Ark. 557, 271 S.W. 720 (1925); Reynolds Metal Co. v. Martin,
269 Ky. 378, 107 S.W.2d 251, appeal dismissed, 302 U.S. 646 (1937); Reed v. Bjornson,
191 Minn. 254, 253 N.W. 102 (1934); Hattiesburg Grocery Co. v. Robertson, 126 Miss.
34, 98 So. 4 (1921), appeal dismissed, 260 U.S. 710.
13. PH. All States Guide, 104 et seq. (State &Local Tax Serv.).
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taxation, despite the constitutional safeguards, is that inequality is rife and
flagrant discriminations are widespread. 14 Assessment practices are a major
14. The classic critique of the American property tax system was made by Professor
E. R. A. Seligman in his Essays in Taxation, Ch. 2 (10th ed. 1931). There Professor
Seligman declared that:
"It is a notorious fact that in scarcely any two contiguous counties is the property
-even the real estate-appraised in the same manner or at the same rate. In
regard to the manner, it frequently happens that corporation property, e.g. the
roadbed of a railway is assessed in one county at an immense sum per mile and
is treated in the adjacent county like a piece of grazing land... .. The official
reports abound with complaints or open confessions that property is assessed all
the way from par to one twenty-fifth of actual value. . . . That this is a glaring
infraction of equality of taxation is apparent . . .as between individuals it results
in gross injustice. A tax rate of a given amount on one may be double, quintuple,
or decuple the nominally equivalent tax on another. The first constitutional
injunction-that of uniformity of taxation-is flagrantly violated." (Pp. 20-21.)
Professor Seligman concludes that "the general property tax in the United States is a
dismal failure" (p. 31) and that "as actually administered [it] is beyond all doubt one
of the worst taxes known in the civilized world." (p. 62) For contrary views as to the
general desirability of retaining the tax and comments on its improvement since Professor
Seligman uttered his strictures against it, see Jensen, Taxation in the United States
(1931) 478 et seq., Groves, Financing Government 73-74 (1945), Schultz and Harriss,
American Public Finance (7th ed. 1959) 387 et seq. The authoritative comprehensive
work on property taxation is Jensen's Property Taxation in the United States (1931).
Studies of property tax inequalities have been published in many states. See Silverhelz,
The Assessment of Real Property in the United States (Sp. Rep. No. 10), N.Y. State
Tax Comm. (1936). James W. Martin, Director of Business Research of the University
of Kentucky, discussed before the 1952 annual meeting of the National Tax Association a
Kentucky Department of Revenue chart showing "Degrees of Inequality of McCracken
and Other Large County Assessments (1951)," which showed variations of 46% to 105%
among the counties (1952 N.T.A. Procs. 54). He commented:
"It can be said without any fear of' being wrong that, if federal income taxes
introduced anything like as much discrimination among taxpayers, there would
be such a howl as the American people have rarely heard." (Id. 53)
In the Baldwin Construction Co. case, note 18, infra, Vanderbilt, C.J. dissenting
(because the court had failed to direct full value assessments of all property on the
rolls) stated:
"The [New Jersey] Commission on State Tax Policy euphemistically but graphically expressed the existing situation in its Fifth Report (1950; p. 4):
'The administration of the general property tax (real estate and improvements) is a chaos. On the business side it is a matter of a more or less gentle
bargaining process that over the years has created a host of insecure but "favorable" conditions!
"This statement is documented with complete county by county tables in its
Sixth Report (1953; p. 30). At page 27 the Commission summarized its findings as
follows:
'Real estate in New Jersey is assessed at an average assessment ratio of 34
per cent of its value. On this basis, the State-wide average tax rate of $6.77 per
$100 valuation taxable in 1952 represents an average effective tax burden of $2.30
per $100 of full value.
'The estimated average assessment ratios vary as among the 21 New Jersey
counties from a low of 16 per cent in Ocean County to a high of 56 per cent
in Hudson County. Six of the State's 21 counties show estimated average assessment ratios above the over-all State-wide average of 34 per cent and three
of them (Hudson, Essex and Passaic) show estimated average assessment ratios
above 40 per cent. On the other extreme, four counties (Ocean, Burlington,
Sussex and Salem) show estimated average assessment ratios of under 20 per cent.
'The variation as among individual municipalities ranges from estimated
average assessment ratios under 10 per cent in seven municipalities to over 60
per cent in two municipalities.'
"Its conclusion (p. 133) seems inescapable:
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cause of the dissatisfaction of millions of taxpayers with their local governments, who year after year see recurring examples of discriminations and preferences among persons, properties and areas, with little or no hope of redress
15
through administrative appeals or judicial review.

Why has the equality and uniformity system thus required by state constitutions broken down? Professor Newhouse's work attests the conclusion that
the failure of the provisions to achieve their objectives in the property tax field
is not any inadequacy in their breadth or language. What are the reasons for
the failure? Where does the failure lie? What are the proper responsibilities
'Never has so much money been raised Irom so many people so inequitably
as inthe current administrationof the local tax on real estate."
Recent studies made by the states based on assessment-sales . ratios, disclose the
following:

State

Year

Average
Ratio

County variation
Low
High
county
county

Kansas
1953
23%
48%
131o
17
36
52
1955*
Minnesota
18
67
40
1954
Pennsylvania
13
38.5
20
1953t
Washington
* Date study was published.
t Includes some 1952 sales.
WASHINGTON STATE
MINNESOTA
Rati0
Type of property
Ratio
Type of property
3891
Warehouses
469o
Public utility
33
Industrial improvements
44 .
Farm
27
Retail stores
39
Commercial
22
Rural property
38
Multiple dwellings
21
Duplex dwellings
35
Industrial
19
Single dwellings
30
Residential
16
Lakeshore
20
Average (weighted)
36
Average (weighted)
See Murray, Overall Progress in the Field of Equalization, 1955 N.T.A. Procs. 4 5s3.
A standard text in Public Finance declares:
"Assessment ratios of individual properties in particular districts in a state
also show wide variation. County averages in Minnesota in 1955 ranged from
17 to 52 per cent, in New York from around 10 to 100 per cent. In one Kansas
county, 39 per cent of properties varied 60 per cent or more from the median.
"City property assessment ratios are generally higher than rural, both because city assessors use more efficient methods and because many cities deliberately
force up the assessment ratio to avoid pressure on debt or tax rate limits.
1... . Improper discriminations result from unequal underassessment, which

may go to extreme lengths. Within any district, individual properties may be
assessed at anywhere from a minute fraction of their true value to considerably
more than their true value. For example, study of one Pennsylvania county revealed that one property was assessed at 60 times its sale price while another
was assessed at only one-fourteenth of its sale price.
"Small properties are usually assessed at a higher proportion of market value
than large properties.. Owners of large properties find protesting high assessments
worth their effort; moreover, assessors are less able to value complex properties
well. In some places, however, such as New York City, political considerations
result in greater underassessment of small residences than of office buildings,
factories, large apartment buildings, and other properties whose owners lack
influential voting power." Schultz and Harriss, American Public Finance, 382-383
(7th ed. 1959).
15. See note 14, supra.
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of legislature, of administrative officers and of judicial tribunals? What efforts
have been made, and what success has attended the many efforts at reform over
the past 150 years or more in making more effective the constitutional mandate
of uniformity and equality?' 6
To these critical questions as to the actual operation of the constitutional provisions Professor Newhouse does not seriously address himself, except
for minor and passing references. The author does refer briefly to the role of
the courts in some States in contributing to the breakdown of the operation
of the constitutional provisions by denying relief to taxpayers in property
assessment inequality cases in the absence of a showing of fraud or arbitrary or
intentionally discriminatory action by the assessors; he discusses this matter at
some length in connection with his review of the Illinois cases.' 7 But he hardly
scratches the surface of this problem.17 a Indeed, while the work was in preparation, the first of the cases in the recent New Jersey "full-value assessment
revolution" took place; in a series of monumental cases the New Jersey courts
first granted relief to taxpayers suffering from unequal taxation' 8-relief that
the Supreme Court of the United States as far back as 1923 had held a constitutional requirement, which in the intervening quarter of a century or more
was largely ignored by the state courts' 9-and then went on to hold that the
assessment procedure was improper because not based on full value; the court
threatened to invalidate the entire assessment roll unless the methods are
radically revised so as to comply with the law 20 True, the latest of the cases
16. There is a large body of data dealing with the efforts of states and localities
to improve assessment methods and inequalities, ranging from the adoption of so-called
scientific methods of assessment, recruitment of more competent and better trained
personnel, the centralization of assessment supervision in state taxing authorities, the
widespread adoption of state-wide equalization procedures and the adoption of classified
property tax systems. See note 14, supra, and as illustrative of the numerous studies, see
Leonard, Assessment Inequalities of Locally Assessed Real Estate in Kansas, Some Important Effects and Some Suggested Causes (1933-1953), Kan. State Comm. of Rev. and
Tax (1954) ; A Study. of Real Property. Assessments in the State of Washington, A Report
of Subcommittee on Revenue and Taxation of Wash. State Leg. Council (1953-55, U. of
Wash. 1958); see the Guide for Assessment Sales Ratio Studies, Nat. Ass'n of Tax
Admr's (1954); Wel, Property Tax Equalization in Illinois, 6 Nat. Tax J. 157 (1953);
Carbert, Full-Value Assessment Versus Fractional-Value Assessment, 1943 Proc. N.T.A.
164; Shannon, Recent State-wide Programs to Improve Local Assessments, 1951 Procs.
N.T.A. 161; Property Assessments and Equalization in California, Rep. of Cal. State
Senate Interim Comm. on State and Local Taxation (Part 6, 1953); and see the extensive
Report of the N.T.A. Committee on State Equalization of Local Property Tax Assessments, 1958 N.T.A. Procs. 316.
17. See pp. 137-139.
17a. For studies dealing with this problem, see Throckmorton, Judicial Review of
Tax Assessments in Iowa, 26 Iowa L. Rev. 723 (1941); Cushman, The Judicial Review
of Valuation in Illinois Property Tax Cases, 35 Ill. L. Rev. 689 (1941); Morgan, Remedies
of Taxpayers to Correct Assessments of Real Estate Taxes, 14 J. Bar Ass'n of D. of C. 476
(1947); Hellerstein, Judicial Review of Property Tax Assessments, 14 Tax L. Rev. 327

(1959).

18. Baldwin Construction Co. v. Essex County Board of Taxation, 16 N.J. 329, 108
A.2d 598 (1954); see Lasser, Assessment of Real Property in New Jersey: An Appraisal
of the Baldwin Case, 9 Rutgers L. Rev. 497 (1955).
19. Sioux -City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 481 (1923).
20. Switz v. Township of Middletown, 23 N.J. 580, 130 A.2d 15 (1957).
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does not in form deal with problems of inequality but with the failure to
assess at full value, but it is widely recognized that the evil which lies at the
bottom of less than full value assessment is its encouragement of inequality
among taxpayers.2 1 These cases have led to frantic efforts at legislative administrative and judicial reform in New Jersey, and they have already had
repercussions in a number of States.
Professor Newhouse's failure to'deal in any significant or searching manner
with the actual operations of the constitutional clauses to which his extensive
study is devoted reduces the stature of the work to an essentially ivory towerish
study of what the courts have said the constitutional provisions mean. I do
not think that I am complaining of the author's failure to write a different book
from the one he undertook, for I believe that we are justified in expecting
twentieth century legal scholars engaging in studies of the magnitude of this
work, not only to analyze and evaluate judicial opinions and doctrine in the
abstract, but to view the constitutional provisions -as a part of living governmental institutions and to consider, in a case such as ours, the practical effects
of judicial interpretation and administrative action on taxpayers and state and
local governments.
Jzi~omu R. HELLERSTEIN
Professor of Law
New York University
21. See Carbert, loc. cit. supra note 16.

22. The New Jersey cases and their repercussions are considered in Hellerstein, loc.
cit. supra, note 17a. For a discussion of the character of review of assessments within
the administrative process and its effects on the taxing process and on the scope of judicial

review, the article last cited and Dane, Are State Tax Courts Necessary? The Massachu.

setts Experience, address before Nat.. Ass'n of Tax Admr's (Coronado, Calif., June 11,
1958), and the study of tax administrative review procedures by Federation of Tax Ad.
ministrators, State Administrative Tax Review: Organization and Practices, Res. Rep. No.

44 (May 1958).

